When we talk about logistics during the Second Punic War the first problem we have it is that we do not know how the Senate organized the supplies of the army. Several authors differentiate the logistics during the Republic with those of the Empire, highlighting how the Imperial had a central authority capable of managing it. The sources are not very specific but Polybius tell us that without the Senate a roman general could not expect to conduct a campaign (Plb. VI, 15, 4-5).

For the imperial period we know that existed fabricae that were the ones that provided the resources need by the army. In Republican period you have no evidence that could support their existence. In this sense, it seems that cities will be the best source for products for the army (Letki 2009, 51-52). How this was managed it is not clear, some authors point that its construction was in private hands and the housing was made by the state (Sierra 2012, 491). For example, Corretti has suggested that Puteolos, which had a very important role from 215 BC onwards in the logistics of the Roman army fighting Hannibal in the Campania, could have hosted some artisans charged to construct equipment. Their will receive the raw materials from Etruria, which Populonia and its surroundings playing a key role (Corretti 2009, 135-36). Although the evidences of the significance of Populonia as a mineral supplier is well attested, we do not have details that can confirm the hypothesis of Corretti.

Quesada has proposed a more general hypothesis concerning the supply of military equipment (Quesada Sanz 2006a, 82). The weapons will be produced in urban workshop, in private hands. During the course of a campaign some objects will be transported to the theatre of operations but others will be obtained in the ground, as some objects were shared, or similar ones, were shared by many of the enemies of Rome.

This are the macro-picture of how the supply worked but, when we focus on some of the general elements we start to have huge problems to define with precision how they were managed. In the first place because we do not know with precision the minimum equipment that the soldiers wore. For example, Bishop and Coulston in their work “Roman Military Equipment. From the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome” referred how little archaeological evidence we have for this period. Lucky for us, in the recent years have been an increasing number of new sites which have shed new light over some aspects of how the Roman army functioned and what equipment can be found. Yet, there is still much elements which we do not know, for that reason, I am going to try to sum the cases in which we know some details of the equipment or we have some references how it was supplied.

If we talk about the most basic equipment of the roman soldier, we have to talk about caligae, tunica and belt. In the first case, we know for sure that they need to replace the nails that the sandals wore but we do not know how it was organized. The evidences derived from experimental archaeology point that a legion of 5000 soldiers would need 15.000 nails every month (Himmler 2008, 454). Moreover, in some cases, as a consequence of the stress of the action developed it could increase. For example, just in the battle of Baecula, it has been estimated that the soldiers lost between 25.000-30.000 nails (Quesada Sanz et al. 2015, 387). Concerning the clothes that soldiers wore is quite difficult to discern how they were supplied.

The Republican Army deducted part of the salary of the soldiers for the reparation of the clothing (VI, 39, 12). How much it represented of the salary we do not know, yet in imperial age it could reach a 30% of the overall salary (G. Sumner 2009, 101). Maybe we can speculate that this deduction extended over new clothes for the army as a whole. Livy mentions several instances where the soldiers are supplied with clothes. They could come from three sources. The first one is through the Senate, we have several references to the sending of clothes to the armies operating in Spain. In the year 215 BC the Scipio received vestimenta (Livy, XXIII, 48, 10-12), also in 211 (Livy, XXVI, 2, 4) and 209 BC (Livy, XXVII, 10, 11-13). Some of the clothes could be send by allies. We know that Hiero II gave some clothing at the beginning of the war (Livy, XXI, 50, 9-10), also Sardinia and Sicily contributed during the Second Macedonian War (Livy, XXXII, 27, 2). This allies could include particulars or a city, like the one that supplied clothes to the cavalry soldiers that survive Cannae (Livy, XXII, 54, 1-5). Finally, the roman army could demand them as a compensation to defeated enemies. For example, the ilergetes had to supply clothing to the roman army in Spain in 205 BC (Livy, XXIX, 3, 4-5).

When we deal with the weapons the most important, from a logistical point of view, are projectiles as they were used with great profusion. In this sense, the equipment found at Grad near Smihel seems to indicate that they are produced in great quantity (Kmetic, Horvat, y Vodopivec 2004, 305). It is also easy to repair and does not need a smith to do it. Considering that the recycling during the battle was impossible, it has to be produced and transported to the army (Sim 1992, 105). Another projectile found in Second Punic contexts are slingshots. They are quite easy to make, even in the middle of a battle as Bosman has shown. Therefore, it can be possible that the construction of the bullets was done in the encampment. Unfortunately, we are unable to know how it was organized the supply but it may be simple to transport the raw materials and then the soldiers will be the ones constructing them (Vlad et al. 2011, 54).

On the other hand, the pilum was a weapon that required a smith. It took a long period to be created, Sim establish that more than ten hours for just one piece and, considering the long time required, maybe a second smith just to finish the piece. Therefore, it will require to be transported. We have to remember that a throwing spear wasn’t limited to the Roman Army, as the soliferrum related to the Iberian, which means that the Roman could obtain from them.

In the case of equipment destined to the protection of the soldiers it is difficult to know how it was supplied. For example, it seems that the Montefortino through II-I BC lost quality so it could indicate an augment in their production. Yet, for the Second Punic War we have no evidence, just one mention for the year 205 BC, when the city of Arretium send 3.000 helmets for Scipio army in Africa (Livy, XXVIII, 45, 13-21). How much it was extened among soldiers we do not know but after the defeat at Calinicus, during the Third Macedonian War, Livy refers how the macedonias obtained much more helmets that any other equipment so maybe that could indicate a widespread use among soldiers. We have very scarce details concerning the scutum, just a mention to the shipment of 3000 to the army of Scipio (Livy, XXVIII, 45, 13-21).

Finally, the armor was something that was extremely expensive for the majority of the soldiers. Therefore, very few of them could wore them. Nevertheless, the main source of protection for the roman soldier was his shield. In this sense, the armor could be an element mostly obtained through plunder and scavenging. Their construction and repair are beyond the abilities of the common soldiers as it required time and equipment that was difficult to carry along with the army. Consequently, we have very few details over they supply and management by the army. One of the few instances is when the Senate recuperate the armors from previous conflicts and handed them to the slaves that were being armed (Livy, XXIII, 14, 4).