This is one of those cases where the answer can be quite short or quite complicated depending on how and how far you want to engage with the dimensions of the issue. I am most certainly not an economic historian, and my contact with the Great Divergence scholarship has generally been pretty tangential. However, there are interesting discussions to be had here about historiographical matters, and also about how Wikipedia editors can sometimes weave historiographical debates from whole cloth.

So, to get the economics side out of the way and to answer the question as phrased, the majority of Anglophone historians writing on the Great Divergence essentially reject the notion that the Qing conquest represented a permanent disruption to the Chinese economy or to its technological and scientific spheres. To quote just a few historians on this count who frankly understand the issues far better than I do:

It is worth noting, for instance, that Chinese interest in the physical sciences and mathematics increased markedly in the seventeenth century, especially after the Manchu conquest in 1644-68, and that publishers found that medical books were a particularly good way to sell lots of books, fulfill a commitment to improve the world through their work, and steer clear of the post-conquest minefields of political controversy.

– Pomeranz, The Great Divergence (2000), p. 44

After the economic decline initiated by the Ming rebellions followed by the disruptions caused by the Manchu invasion, the eighteenth century witnessed the resettlement of deserted land, the opening of new fields, and a renewed commercial expansion spanning even larger portions of the empire. Economic growth in the middle and upper Yangzi regions complemented growth in the lower Yangzi. Parts of North and Northwest China also increased production. The dynamics of Smithian expansion were present throughout.

– R Bin Wong, China Transformed (2001), p. 21

The upheavals of the late Ming rebellions and the Manchu con quest hindered growth in most of the seventeenth century, so that by 1700 the population still did not exceed 160 million. Then in the course of the eighteenth century it more than doubled, from some 160 million in 1700 to 350 million in 1800 – an unprecedented gain of nearly 200 million people. Yet standards of living were apparently higher in the eighteenth century than they had been a century earlier. Sustaining such a massive population increase without a substantial decline in living standards implies a lifting of Malthusian constraints – something usually associated only with "modern" economic growth. Thus to dismiss the early and high Qing economic increase as "merely" extensive growth misstates an extraordinary achievement.

– Jack Goldstone, 'Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History: Rethinking the "Rise of the West" and the Industrial Revolution' (2002), p. 351

What is interesting, however, is that much of this core Anglophone scholarship suggesting that the underlying basis of the Qing economy remained decently strong through the eighteenth century predates the spate of Chinese historians offering explanations for Qing economic weakness without necessarily providing firm evidence for that weakness actually being extant. The Wikipedia editors' inclusion of Kenneth Pomeranz's critique of what we might term the 'Qing Conquest Theory' is absolutely fascinating because at least one of the articles (Xu's) appears to directly respond to it. But in turn, there is little to suggest that the Anglophone historiography has felt the need to respond to this spate of Chinese-language scholarship, which appears to find roots in a particular strand of nativist and ethnic nationalist interpretations of Chinese history, wherein 'foreign conquest dynasties' like the Mongol Yuan and Manchu Qing are moralistically denigrated for their foreignness.

What the talk page of the Wikipedia article reveals is that this page's survival appears to have been largely contingent on a failure to successfully mobilise a strong front against its continued existence on the site, despite the page being marked as unreliable since August 2010. Both in 2010 (shortly after its creation) and in 2021, there have been extensive arguments over whether the article ought to exist at all, and even if it does, whether the title is misleading in asserting the existence of a particular theory under a term that appears to have been coined by the original author of the Wikipedia page, with no attestations in the Chinese or Anglophone scholarship cited. Per the 2021 discussion however, the term has leaked into some publications in the years since 2010, in a textbook case of what the webcomic xkcd termed 'citogenesis' – a bad-faith or clueless user puts an unverified or even unverifiable fact up on the internet, which a later good-faith reader replicates in a more formal publication, which then gets cited retroactively to support the original claim.

So, the question of 'is the Qing conquest theory true' actually holds an unexpected double meaning – not just whether what it purports to claim is correct, but also whether there is such a thing as a 'Qing conquest theory'. Now, on that count, I would argue that yes, there is such a thing, insofar as one can point to a body of Chinese-language scholarship that does genuinely argue that the Qing conquest of China in the 1640s and subsequent Qing policy within China were a cause of economic and scientific stagnation or even decline, and one can coin a term to describe it. 'Qing conquest theory' would not be an unreasonable term to impose in that it does literally encompass what these historians argue.

The problematic aspect to this discussion is ultimately the way that this has entered the online space. A Wikipedian decided around 2010 that their characterisation of a body of Chinese scholarship was deserving of an article, and the end result was something that mostly replicated the arguments in those articles (especially Xu (2005), who is cited a whopping 12 times in an article with 42 total citations, except the link to the cited article is dead) without a full examination of how other scholars reacted to it – quite possibly because few specialists outside China cared about stuff that was mostly nationalist nonsense. What we now have is an article whose genesis lies with one particular person more than a decade ago, and which has essentially never been updated to discuss more modern scholarship – you will note that its bibliography includes nothing in Chinese more recent than 2010, and nothing in English more recent than 2007. It's not that we cannot speak of such a concept, but its current articulation on the internet is extremely problematic.