This is something of a non-answer, but I would say, I don't think there is an "consensus of historians" on this sort of thing. This is one isolated claim, one that doesn't have any citations supporting it, that is not totally implausible, but also not totally obvious either. It is very, very hard to do any kind of "real history" regarding Israel and nuclear weapons, because they do not acknowledge having them, and it is essentially "taboo" to talk about such things within Israel. The number of scholars who work in this area is tiny — a handful.

Avner Cohen is one of them, and a good friend and collaborator and co-author of mine. He mostly is able to make progress on these things by interviewing people, especially people who are very old and agree to talk to him only on the condition that he keeps the interviews private until they die. Even these interviews are not authoritative, because aside from the fallibility of memory and access, this is a shadowy world where people work to keep secrets or perpetuate myths well after their own deaths. I say this not to undermine his work in any way, but just to indicate how difficult it is to do "solid" history, or to have "consensus" in such a field. Avner says that Israel apparently did not build or deploy tactical nuclear weapons, and does not seem to find Hersh's "high" estimates all that credible (they are much higher than most estimates), but he acknowledges that these are areas with significant gray areas in them.

Hersh is a difficult source to work with. He's a journalist, and one quite expert and cultivating sources in the classified communities of the world. But of course he keeps his sources secret, too, and it's impossible to cross-reference a lot of his claims. Some have turned out to be quite on the money (famously the Glomar Explorer story). Some people are more dubious about. There is really no doubt (because we have the records of some of these deliberations) that the CIA and so on have tried to manipulate Hersh's reporting by feeding him versions of stories that might be untrue or half-true and so on. Obviously Hersh, a veteran of this circuit, is aware of this being a hazard of the job, and does not simply repeat what he is told uncritically or without trying to substantiate it. But nobody in this line of work is going to have a 100% perfect track record, and one can never tell from the end reporting what the epistemic status of what Hersh reports is, because he has to (as a means of maintaining access to those secret sources and protecting them) cover his own tracks. My sense is that scholars in these areas of history treat Hersh as an "actor" in these stories and not as a "scholar" in it; someone to be considered and contextualized, but not believed outright. This is no slander against Hersh, again. It is just part of the difficulty of doing this kind of reporting.

My sense is that scholars do not take The Sampson Option as a totally reliable source. Here's the passage in question:

Vanunu's photographs, which had been shipped by [Ari] Ben-Menashe [an Israeli intelligence agent] directly to Israel—he was under strict orders to stay away from the Israeli embassy—created havoc. Ben-Menashe was told the next morning, "They're real." He was also told that Peres was personally handling the crisis. Ben-Menashe learned one of the reasons a few days later: there was fear that Vanunu knew that Israel had deployed nuclear land mines along the Golan Heights-and that he would talk about it. The land mines had been put in place in the early 1980s, when Vanunu was still working at Dimona.

Notice a few things here. One is that there is no citation; for each chapter, Hersh has a little "notes" section at the end of the book, but it isn't very helpful because it doesn't link them to actual claims. In this case, it says that Hersh interviewed British journalists who broke the Vanunu story; one of them may have been the source of information about Ben-Menashe, because they were allegedly in touch with him. So imagine that this is how Hersh got the info: Hersh interviewed another journalist who told him what an Israeli asset told him. Maybe. That would be the ideal chain because at least it's pretty straightforward. It seems a little unlikely, though. Why would this Israeli asset tell the British journalist what they hope would not be released to the public, and why? There's got to be something a bit more complicated going on here, and that's the kind of thing we can't really sort out after the fact.

You might ask: why would someone claim nuclear landmines were deployed if they weren't? Disinformation about Israel's nuclear weapons is common and deliberately propagated by many parties, including Israel itself, towards many different ends (including, probably, simply clouding the truth — in a sea of rumors, can you pick out the grain of truth? — and increasing the uncertainty of Israel's enemies that they could militarily "manage" a nuclear-armed Israel). So who knows who told who what or why.

The second thing to notice here is that the claim is actually a secondary claim attached to a bigger one. It's a discussion about the Vanunu revelations, where an (explosive!) sub-claim is appended as almost an afterthought. Hersh seems to care less about the deployment than the Vanunu aspect, and doesn't follow up on it. Unsurprisingly, other sources find that claim more interesting than the Vanunu part of it. Anyway, I just point this out because it's one of those things that a scholar will look at and say, well, this looks a little undeveloped as a claim, and the fact that even Hersh is keeping it on the sidelines seems to imply that he isn't so sure of it, either. (He makes reference to it two other times in the book: once in noting that Vanunu apparently didn't know about them — I mean, they might not have existed! — and the other in a sort of summary in the very last paragraph of the book: "Meanwhile, Israeli field commanders have accepted nuclear artillery shells and land mines as battlefield necessities: another means to an end.")

Anyway. How does one create "historical consensus" on a subject where only a handful of historians work, where the epistemic status is unclear (by which I mean not just "is it true?" but "what is the source of the claim?" and "how much uncertainty exists?"), and the main way to do the research is through whisper networks of historical actors who are all deeply connected to intelligence agencies? It's really the wrong way to think about it. There is no "consensus" on such things. There are just how individual historians write about them, and there are how individual historians talk about them — which are not the same thing (Avner only writes things he feels essentially 100% about, but he will talk at length, privately, about his shifting feelings on other matters) — and there is no real way for any "consensus" to emerge in that kind of situation. Again, I would emphasize how tiny this subfield of history is. This is not a topic like "the American Civil War" where you have hundreds of historians having worked on it for a century, and new PhDs doing research on it all the time. The number of scholars in this area, living and dead, can be counted on your fingers.

You can read more about Avner's work and data here, as well as his books (Israel and the Bomb and The Worst-Kept Secret).