The inner political processes within the Confederacy are very interesting, in my opinion, especially because most people conceive the Confederate political class as one united body. While there weren't any formal political parties, there were several factions that many a historian has considered "proto-parties", which reflected the differences in thought and methods between the Southern leaders. In time, they probably would have developed into fully-fledged political organizations, but during the war they naturally focused on the prime wartime issues, chiefly the acts of the Jefferson Davis regime and how far they were willing to go in order to win. Aside from the supporters of the war, the Confederacy also had its contingent of pro-peace people, sometimes called "Confederate Copperheads", "Reconstructionists", or "Tories".

First, we must dispel with the idea that all Confederates were Democrats. While it is true that some prominent Confederates came from a Democratic background, such as Jefferson Davis, not all Confederates were Democrats (Lee was not a Democrat for example), and not all Democrats were Confederates. The second you yourself acknowledge, when you talk of those Democrats "who stuck with the Union". In truth, though secession was the breaking point, previous to that, tensions between the Northern and Southern wings of the Democratic Party had been increasing. After the Compromise of 1850, and as they came to see Northern Whigs as anti-slavery fanatics, Whiggery declined tremendously in the South. It didn't completely die as some might say, and Whiggish tendencies survived in the form of voters that wanted moderation, compromise, and a revival of a "national" party system, with parties with both Northern and Southern wings. The vote for Fillmore in 1856 and then Bell in 1860 is usually taken as a sign of "enduring Whiggery". But notwithstanding these blocs, the Democratic Party came to more or less dominate the South, with the Southern faction becoming more prominent as the Republicans gathered strength in the North. It's been described as a vicious cycle, whereby Southern actions weakened Northern Democrats, making Southerners more prominent and powerful, which in turn resulted in more pro-slavery measures.

However, as the decade continued, the Northern Democrats grew increasingly uncomfortable with their Southern brethren. Many were anti-slavery, and a lot of them bolted to the Republican Party. But the core of the Northern Democracy was racist and more preoccupied with the maintenance of the Union. Epitomized by Stephen A. Douglas, this group held racist beliefs, apathy towards the plight of the enslaved, and a belief that both anti-slavery and pro-slavery extremists had to be shunned. This allowed them to tolerate slavery, but they couldn't bring themselves to fully support Southerners in all their projects. Following the debacle of Bleeding Kansas, they voted with Republicans to prevent the illegitimate admittance of Kansas as a slave state. This made Douglas a persona non grata in the South. So when Northerners tried to nominate him, the Southerners refused and split the party, nominating John C. Breckinridge instead. The 1860 election then became a contest between Bell and Breckinridge in the South, and Lincoln and Douglas in the North. The antebellum party system had effectively been ended in the South, and when secession started the pre-war labels lost all meaning as people instead identified themselves as either pro-secession or anti-secession, pro-Davis or anti-Davis, and, by the end, pro-war and anti-war.

When the First Confederate Congress met, all the members were officially non-partisan. Jefferson Davis and his associates were non-partisan as well. The Whig Party didn't exist, the former Democrats didn't want to know about the party of the traitor Douglas, and even those Bell voters now mostly turned in favor of secession. They instead wanted to present a united front in favor of secession and Confederate independence. "The spirit of party has never shown itself for an instant in your deliberations", the President pro term of the First Congress congratulated the lawmakers. But, just like the Union, the Confederacy was deeply divided between different factions. Historian James McPherson has explained that actually, instead of a source of strength and unity, the lack of parties was a weakness, for political parties "disciplined and channeled political activity", meaning, the Republican Party was a firm source of support for Lincoln, and the opposition of the Democrats made Republicans close ranks. By contrast, "the Davis administration had no such means to mobilize support. No parties meant no institutionalized discipline over congressmen or governors. Davis could not invoke party loyalty and patronage in behalf of his policies, as Lincoln could. Opposition to the Davis administration became personal or factional and therefore difficult to deal with."

Initially, the problem wasn't so bad as the start of the war saw a "rally round the flag" effect around Davis. But as the war progressed and became harder, and Davis was forced to employ once-unthinkable policies like conscription and the centralization of power, many started to turn against him and the war he conducted the war effort. This anti-Davis faction never became a true organized political party, but it did reflect sentiments in favor of a less powerful executive, less centralization, more respect for individual rights, and maintaining the independence of planters instead of demanding sacrifices from them. The faction included the Vice-President, Alexander Stephens; Georgia Governor Joseph Brown; the powerful politician Robert Toombs; and many others who bitterly denounced Davis as a tyrant for the draft, the suspension of habeas corpus, his taxes, and his pretensions over the property of the planters. At their most extreme, they said that Davis was a worse tyrant than Lincoln and that independence wasn't justified if it meant losing all their liberties. They didn't seem to grasp that many of these measures were necessary to win the war, and that defeat would mean their perdition. At the end, when Davis tried to enlist Black men in the Confederate Army as a last-ditch measure, they candidly said they would rather have their slaves emancipated by Lincoln than taken by Davis for a single minute.

Most of these anti-Davis men were former Whigs and Conditional Unionists. Conversely, most of the pro-Davis people were former Democrats and Fire Eaters, for their pro-slavery and pro-secession beliefs made them more willing to swallow extreme measures in order to win the war. But there was a "lack of a definite pattern", with both factions having people from all antebellum political parties and movements. During the Confederate Congressional Elections of 1863, the people running identified themselves with issues and whether they supported Davis or not. It must be said that among these groups the widespread conviction that the Confederacy should be independent, and that slavery was a positive good remained. The disagreement was only over whether they thought Davis and his policies were the correct, more effective way to achieve the aims of independence and protecting slavery. This was then a "pro-war but anti-administration faction". Their opposition to Davis, nonetheless, clogged the Confederate war machine by preventing the enforcement of the draft, encouraging defiance, and preventing a truly national effort. Brown, for example, appointed thousands militia officers (who were exempt from the national draft), kept soldiers and equipment in Georgia, and openly denounced Davis, which weakened his regime.

Then there's a third faction to consider, those who were truly in favor of peace. Men like Stephens or Brown sometimes seemed to be in favor of peace, but until the very end their efforts were always in favor of a peace that recognized the independence of the Confederacy. They tried to get Davis to open negotiations with Lincoln following military victories, which they thought would encourage Northern Peace Democrats. But Davis rejected these ideas as something that would weaken the South just as much. They wanted a conditional peace, and even when the military situation turned hopeless some thought they could extract generous terms of reunion from Lincoln. But aside from them there were people who supported an unconditional peace, believing the war to be so terrible and devastating that they ought to submit to the Union to have peace no matter the cost. This movement was more prominent in North Carolina, where William Holden gathered supporters of peace in a "Conservative Party" that advocated for North Carolina to secede from the Confederacy and rejoin the Union. Some thought that this voluntary reunion would allow them to keep slavery and some of their power, but their primary concern remained peace. Again, until the very end this was an unpopular faction. It was actively repressed by both Davis and the anti-Davis governor Zebulon Vance, and when Vance and Holden faced each other in an election Holden was "smothered" - Vance received 88 percent of the soldier vote and 7 7 percent of the civilian vote. Vance's appeal was based on the idea that submitting to the Union would destroy slavery and White Supremacy, and that only winning the war would bring about safety and enduring peace.

So, to summarize, there weren't any formal political parties in the Confederacy. The political process that brought about secession also destroyed the antebellum party system, and the Confederates were officially non-partisan. There were, however, several factions organized around opposition or support of the Davis regime, which sometimes echoed the old parties. Then there were the supporters of unconditional peace. None of these factions ever became an organized party, so the name of "proto-parties" is more fitting.