Its first worth examining the strategic picture at the start of 1918.

The most significant events of the previous year were the entry of the US into the war, the collapse of the Russian Empire in the east, and the gradual starvation of the Central Powers by the Royal Navy blockade.

Meanwhile, German attempts to blockade Britain with U-Boots had failed and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had become a very dangerous enemy indeed. The battle of Cambrai had shown that the BEF was capable of making a sudden breakthrough, but in return, the Germans were reassured that they too had the ability to make a breakthrough due to the success of their counter attack, which pushed the BEF back to its start lines.

Although not yet fit for combat, American troops were arriving in France in vast numbers meaning the clock was ticking on the chances of German victory.

But the Germans were now in a position to transfer vast numbers of men and huge quantities of material from the east to the western front, giving them an unprecedented asymmetry of force.

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This was the context for the German Spring Offensives - a 'Hail Mary' attempt to win the war in a single campaign of battles to knock out the BEF, and defeat the French, before the Americans became effective, and before Germany starved.

Thus, it made sense for the Germans to primarily target the BEF - to split them from the French Army and drive them back onto the Channel ports.

The Germans at this point had an unwitting ally in the form of British Prime Minister, David Lloyd-George.

LG believed the war could not be won on the western front, and that the correct strategy was to knock out Germany's allies and so win by "knocking away the props". This was of course nonsense, but seductive nonsense nonetheless.

To say that LG disliked Haig, the BEF's Commander in Chief, is a massive understatement. LG connived to undermine Haig as much as possible. He tried to subordinate the BEF to the French, which outraged the British Army. He tried to have Haig replaced, but as Churchill put it "no man could be perceived his equal"

Finally, LG decided in late 1917 to starve the BEF of manpower. Despite plaintiff warnings of a German spring offensive, LG hoarded troops in the UK while agreeing that the BEF would take over additional miles of frontage from the French.

This had the impact of compelling Haig to reduce the number of battalions in a BEF Brigade from four to three.

The effect of this was disastrous. Normally a Brigade would rotate its battalions, with one up the line, 2 in the second line training, labouring etc. and the last resting.

Thus at a time when the BEF desperately needed to be re-training in defensive warfare and constructing the necessary fortifications for defence in depth they became in the words of one officer "a bunch of deskilled ditch diggers and cable buriers"

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Finally, a comment on the German "Stormtrooper" doctrine. While other powers relied on improving the overall quality of their armies, the Germans instead hived off their best troops in specialist Stormtrooper formations.

While these formations were doubtless effective, doing so reduced the quality of the remainder of their army. Further, as these formations would be at the spearhead, they would suffer disproportionately high casualties.

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Thus the stage was set. A numerically superior German army with its best men on point, would fall on a BEF that was frankly in a bit of a state.

Initial success, therefore, was a foregone conclusion. However, the Germans were unable to translate success at the operational level into success at the strategic level due to a number of factors.

Firstly, as Germany was unable to import horses and mules from overseas due to the blockade, no cavalry was available to pursue and exploit initial break throughs. This gave time and space for British and French armies to recover and retreats never became routs.

Secondly, as mentioned above, as Stromtrooper units suffered high losses, the overall quality of the German army deteriorated rapidly.

Thirdly, Ludendorff had no sense of an overall strategy. He simply attacked where he perceived the chances of success to be greatest instead of targeting strategically important locations "Make a hole, everything else follows". The Germans therefore found themselves having conquered relatively large amounts of worthless territory which greatly exacerbated their logistical difficulties.

Therefore, inevitably, the German offensives faltered and then were stopped dead by the French at the 2nd Battle of the Marne.

The BEF would then deliver a hammer blow at Amiens "der schwarze tag des Deutschen heeres" and it was all one way traffic after that.