I'm watching the Netflix documentary on the Battle of Chosin right now.

And it raises so many questions.

First a very specific one:

Regimental Combat Team 31 eventually started their retreat to the main encampment with a convoy of 500 wounded. They expected to find a tank detachment along the way but didn't. Eventually the entire taskforce scattered and ran partly because they had their hopes set on finding their tanks there.

Was this taskforce of over 2000 men just forgotten? The US had overwhelming air superiority and at some point a general even choppered in. So how could they not have known there weren't tanks waiting for them? Was there no leadership? No communication?

The Netflix documentary pretty much stops the army side of the story as 300 able bodied men walk into the camp.. It isn't stated that firmly but it's obvious the men just ran and/or mutinied which I completely understand if they were told nothing of the situation. Did they even know if Hagaru was still there?

Second question:

Why was there no effort made to support them from Hagaru? They were just a few miles from a base filled with 1000s of American soldiers. There were choppers and air-planes flying overhead. All of this seems to take place within like 5 miles of each other. I feel if the Hagaru contingent secured the high ground to their North East (something they'd be smart to do anyways) they'd be halfway the convoy. Surely small groups of men could have reached the convoy and tanks could have advanced up the road.

Third Question:

At the start of the battle an airfield is being constructed. Wasn't this ever fully accomplished? Couldn't helicopters land? They were flying 200 combat sorties a day but had no helicopters to evacuate the wounded from outside hagaru? Surely combat engineers can get a basic airfield up in a week? They say they airlifted out 4500 wounded but that doesn't seem that many from a fully completed airport. Considering this took place over more than a week that's 500 a day with air-planes that could carry 25. That's 20 flights a day. They say they flew 2 hours to Japan so each plane could go twice. Were there really only 10 planes ferrying people? Those same planes could also have flown in 5000 reinforcements from Japan.

The documentary really tells individual stories very well but I'm left wondering what the heck went wrong over there.

Which leads to my Fourth question:

The Chinese and North Korean troops were dependent on the same bad roads the Allies were. Now I get that for a few days they could just carry their food and ammunition but that battle lasted days. That seems like perfect defensive terrain. How come the Allied lines didn't stabilize after a little while? They survived a surprise attack with overwhelming numbers. Surely once they got their act together it must have been easier and easier to hold selected high grounds?

A surprise attack by the Chinese with little to no supplies seems like an all or nothing gambit. And they didn't get all. At the end of it they must have been stranded in the mountains without artillery or tanks and no air support.

I feel like 10.000 concentrated marines supported by an airfield sitting on a road had a much stronger strategic position than the unsupported supposedly starving Chinese soldiers that were invading North Korea on foot in the winter. After the casualty shipments stopped those 20 plane flights a day could ferry in 10 tons of supplies a day versus the Chinese zero. And it's said that there were also constant supply para drops.

And this corps was tying up like a 100 thousand Chinese troops! The Chinese already had 30k casualties in their own surprise attack, at the start of their own campaign (when they should really in the strongest position) and were by the account of the documentary "scattered and unable to mount an offense".

Then they start about how it's minus 50. And the Chinese are there in sneakers and without winter clothing or tents or vehicles!

So the question is: Why not remain there and fight it out? It sounds like the marines were in a better position to isolate and wipe out the Chinese forces than vice versa. At like day 9 and 75% through the documentary I'm like the Americans have won this.

And a very general fifth question:

I started reading into this and read that the US army was literally raiding parade grounds/museums/old battlegrounds for tanks.

Surely the US most have been in the early stages of the cold war? If they couldn't field armoured divisions in Korea how could they ever have hoped to defend Western Europe from the Soviets?

And wasn't the build up of the US army intensifying even through 1945? How come that 5 years after they were so horrifically reduced that I'm reading the navy couldn't even blockade North Korea and that they couldn't arm and supply their forces on the ground? Did they stand down the military to such a degree that they were actually destroying weapons/ammo/tanks? Didn't they have thousands of combat vets from the first world war to rely on? I get not having a standing army but the Korean War had been going on for half a year by then. Didn't they just mothball the weapons/planes/tanks of the 2nd world war? Surely in 5 years there hadn't been that big a technological push that those were worthless.

So, lots of questions, it just left me very very puzzled. Thanks for reading :)

Their army was larger than any Balkan nation and they still lost, at least spies could get to some info.

Almost anyone with a high school education can tell you that 6 million Jews were murdered in the Holocaust, yet I find barely anyone knows of the numbers of (for example) the Ukrainian Terror Famine or the Great Leap Forward. Why?

Granted that there would have be a great variety of reactions given different political circumstances, but was there a general "party line"?

I have read couple of books on notable persons during the Russian revolution, but not one about Lenin. Which in your opinion is the best book about Lenin at the moment?

They number well into 200s and 300s where's anglo American aces had faar less

While listening to the podcast "in our time -the siege of Malta" at one point the topic of asking Spain for reinforcements comes up.

This situation comes up a lot when learning history. It's mentioned, rather vaguely usually, that the sieged city ( in this case island) send for reinforcements but the specific means by which they do this aren't given.

Perhaps I'm imagining sieges ignorantly in my modern mind? What I imagine when I think of a siege is that NOTHING gets in or out. Was the reality of a siege more along the lines of a severe restriction of supplies/people/communication rather than the absolute and total blockade that I'm imagining? Were complete blockades impossible and things and people inevitably managed to get in and out just at a restricted rate? If so, how? Wouldn't the attacking army just run down anyone trying to get in or out of a city or island?

(all per wiki) Did he run on these issues? Was there any sense of whiplash?

Hi all,

basically, I am wondering how one is expected to deal with other historians that have written about the same historical events/development one wishes to write about.

Of course, at the beginning of an article/thesis chapter I discuss the literature that has previously covered the events I wish to write about and explain how I will discuss/interpret these events differently in the article/chapter. I then normally continue to unfold my argument mainly using primary sources and some secondary literature for background and possibly for some summary of the parts of the events I do not cover in detail.

However, even if one's own focus, interpretation of the events and argument is different from previous scholarship on these events and one mainly uses primary sources as evidence for one's writing, I feel that at times one is still bound to make some small points that are not the same but similar to what other historians have said. I am not talking about major arguments here, but rather about small parallels. For example, if I discuss the negotiation of a treaty between country A and country B and country B manages to improve the terms of the treaty for itself during the negotiations, this is something that I can show with primary sources (and probably do so more accurately than the previous literature), but others might have mentioned before. In this case, would I need to acknowledge everyone that has mentioned the fact that country B managed to improve the treaty terms?

I am unsure about this because of course one is taught that one should acknowledge the ideas of others. But I do not know if citing them at the beginning of the article/chapter is enough. At the same time, I think that having to acknowledge every parallel with other historians would mean a great increase in footnotes and practically make it impossible to write about events that have been covered by several historians before. I also do not see historians acknowledging such similar points. For example, I recently even came across two books that were published on the same topic and time period and the author of the second book published somewhat later than the first only acknowledged in the introduction that this first book exists and how his own work is different, but does not mention the first book again (except to criticize it) during the rest of the book, even though there are bound to be some parallels.

Apologies for the long post and thanks in advance.

This may well be a stupid question, but I'm unsure how to classify the belief of the Israelites. Because in between the Exodus and the Promised Land it wasn't strictly Judaism yet, was it?

Maybe I am just mistaking my terms, but any answer is appreciated :)

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Was there a similar desire to colonise or did they feel the need to sabotage their fellow Europeans? Or did they not care?

In particular, did the early pre-German states have apprehensions about the growing global power of the British commonwealth and French colonies? Once Germany was established did this apprehension surface into government foreign affairs etc?

When drawn on a map, would Africa be below them?

Take the Black Swamp in Ohio for example. How would a settler know where he was, or confirm that he was on land that was his?

My family emigrated to the United states in 1894 from Hesse. Verbal (loose) history says it was because of something political. I haven't been able to find any ships records for my family which backs up the idea that they came here secretly.

On the final days of the World Wars, I imagine every man and woman who were enlisted in the British Army were sent home to their families. Is there any record of the amount of soldiers who remained enlisted after the fact, or what the process was for declaring their exit from the army?

Both my grandfathers (both now passed) emigrated from Italy in the early 20th century and I was wondering what their communication was like with the families they left behind. Could they write letters, make phone calls, or was it basically the end of contact?

Thanks!

Sorry if that's a confusing title. I'm just curious since heirs were so important and everyone slept around so much. If a queen was having an affair and gave birth to a child and claimed it to be her husbands; was their any way to prove who was the child of the father? Is there a possibility some royal bloodline died long ago and no one knew about it?

So obviously this is an incredibly broad question, but I'm thinking specifically around the Mediterranean and the from ~500 to ~1400 CE. I'm no expert on naval warfare during any era, but based on what I know it seems like you don't see many massive naval engagements like the Battles of Salamis and Actium during the Middle Ages. If this is the case, was it a result of naval combat becoming less central to warfare as a whole, a dearth of polities that could field large armadas like the Romans and Persians did, or something else entirely?

Additionally, did the methods of naval warfare change dramatically during this period? My understanding of classical naval combat was that it relied heavily on ramming, boarding and using soldiers equipped with bows, javelins, etc to rain missiles on opposing vessels. Was this also the case in the area during the Middle Ages, or did new technologies and tactics dramatically change the way ships engaged one another (I know, for example, that the Arabs had invented effective torpedoes by some point in the 13th century)?