https://www.lib.auburn.edu/archive/aghy/slaves.htm

Some that caught my attention.

1. John Cunningham hired a slave named Dave. One evening, Cunningham’s son and overseer told Dave to feed and curry the horses and mules. Dave failed to carry out his assignment. The next day, the overseer confronted him, grabbed him by the collar, and told him to drop his pants for a whipping. Dave pulled a knife and cut young Cunningham, who then directed another slave, Step, to knock Dave in the head with an ax. Dave threatened Step, who backed away. Eventually, Dave broke and ran. He was charged with assault with intent to kill. On appeal, Judge Gibbons ruled that a master had "absolute dominion" over a slave and the right to enforce obedience. On the other hand, if a slave was merely disobedient, and not acting violently, the master could not threaten life and limb. Furthermore, slaves had a "natural right" to self-defense, but could not legally employ it "in the perpetration of a wrong." Dave v State, 22 Alabama 23 (1853).

slaves have a right to self-defense?

2. The slave Joe belonged to Henry Skinner, who loaned him to William H. Spivey. Following Skinner’s death, Spivey sold the slave. Subsequently, he was convicted under Section 3130 of the code, which prohibited carrying away another’s slave and converting the same to one’s own use. Judge Rice noted that 3130 went beyond the common law in affording protection to "the most valuable species of personal property owned in this country." In addition to having monetary value, slaves were "intelligent creatures," with the power of volition and locomotion, which dictated laws "suited to the nature of the property intended to be protected." Under the common law, a bailee could not commit larceny "unless he broke the bulk of the package" of the goods under his protection. With slaves, the bailee committed a felony if he carried away a slave with criminal intent. Spivey v State, 26 Alabama 90 (1855).

intelligent creatures?

3. Spencer stole a slave, but was apprehended. The day after his arrest, the slave made several incriminating declarations within Spencer’s hearing. He did not respond to the allegations. The original trial court accepted his failure to respond as evidence of agreement. Spencer appealed his convictions, contending in part that the declaration of a slave required no response from a white person. Judge Goldthwaite ruled otherwise. To reject the slave’s declaration as evidence would have meant that, under no circumstances, could a slave’s statement call for a response from a white man. Furthermore, there would have been no question of admissibility had Spencer replied to the slave'’ statement with a direct admission. In other words, it could be inferred from the silence of a white man that the statement of a slave was true. Spencer v State, 20 Alabama 24 (1852).

So in some circumstances, the words of slave were to be trusted as valid?

4. Isaac J. Kirkendall, a white overseer, saw Abram, a slave, loitering around the quarters. He ordered him to work. Abram replied that he was sick and could not work. Kirkendall felt his pulse, declared him healthy, and again ordered him to work. Abram moved off slowly. Kirkendall struck him with a whip and the slave grabbed the whip. Kirkendall kicked at him and Abram grabbed his leg and threw him to the ground. Kirkendall pulled a gun and Abram knocked it out of his hand. The two continued fighting and the slave bit off a portion of the overseer’s upper ear. He was charged and convicted of mayhem against a white person, a capital offense. The prisoner appealed. Before the Supreme Court, his counsel argued that the ear was only partially bitten off, so the act did not constitute mayhem. He further contended that if a slave was unable to work he was not bound to do so. The court ruled that the act was not mayhem, but that the master or overseer was empowered to determine when slaves could and could not work. Judge Ormond wrote that "when engaged in mortal strife, his adversary armed with a deadly weapon," a slave might act according to "the instinctive dread of death, common alike to the bound and the free," and inflict a wound in self-defense "in which the will did not cooperate," willfulness being a component of the crime. State v Abram, 10 Alabama 928 (1847).

So if a slave is beaten severely enough where involuntary self-defense kicks in does that mean in some conditions the slaves is not punished?

5. Thomas Burps suspected that one of Bowen Bennett’s slaves had stolen his hogs. Burps and several others, including Hobson Thompson, went to the slave’s quarters in search of the stolen meat. Judge Goldthwaite ruled that they had no right to do this without due process of law. The slave’s quarters were protected against illegal search no less than the master’s home, unless specified by statute. "Great abuses" would result if the law were otherwise. Thompson v State, 25 Alabama 41 (1854).

Slaves have due process and implied right to privacy?

6. Wyatt ran away the same night his master’s gin house burned. The master directed his foreman and other slaves to capture him "dead or alive." Following Wyatt’s capture, the master said to him, "Well, boy, you have done it now." Later, he said, "these denials only make the matter worse." Wyatt confessed and was taken before a magistrate, to whom he again confessed. The Dallas Circuit Court sentenced him to death, but the case was appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court. Judge Chilton ruled the confession involuntary. The power of a master over a slave gave the former’s words extraordinary weight. The same inducement to confess vitiated Wyatt’s statement before the magistrate. Normally, confessions before a magistrate would not be excluded solely because the prisoner had not been warned of their consequences. In a case where the confessions were made earlier under circumstances that rendered it improper, the failure of the magistrate to warn the slave had a fatal effect. Wyatt v State, 25 Alabama 9 (1854).

Slaves cannot give a voluntary confession due to the power imbalance?

7. Pleasant killed his owner, William Copeland. The indictment said that Pleasant belonged to "the late William Copeland." Judge Dargan noted that earlier decisions required the indictment of a slave for murder to contain the name of the owner. Copeland was dead so the indictment was defective. Pleasant v State, 17 Alabama 190 (1850).

That technicality worked?

8. The state indicted Thurman for the rape of a white woman. This crime carried the death penalty for any "slave, free Negro, or mulatto" so convicted. Though Thurman had some black blood, he was not a mulatto in the strict sense of being the offspring of a white/black relationship. Judge Parsons asked: "If the statute against mulattos is by construction to include quadroons, then where are we to stop?" Consequently, he reversed and remanded the case. Thurman v State, 18 Alabama 276 (1850).

The anti-one drop of blood?

9. George Eberlin sold sugar and candles to two slaves without their masters’ consent. The indictment failed to name the masters or the slaves, but described the latter as "one black boy, about twenty years of age, and one yellow boy, stout and heavy." On appeal, Eberlin argued that the indictment should have named the slaves and the masters. Judge Rice disagreed. Eberlin v Mayor of Mobile, 30 Alabama 548 (1857).

Is yellow boy supposed to be racist for asian or jaundice?

10. Henry and George were mulattos living with a white man named Jones in Marion County. Before he died, Jones declared that they were born of a free woman and hence free themselves. Later, Winter was indicted for aiding in their escape from the administrator of the Jones estate. As mulattos, Henry and George were presumed to be slaves, but the presumption could have been rebutted by evidence of Jones’ declaration. At the trial, however, the judge refused to charge the jury to acquit if they had reasonable doubt of their slave status. On appeal, Judge Ligon ruled that the state had not proven Henry and George to be the property of Jones. He reversed the circuit court ruling. Winter v State, 20 Alabama 39 (1852).

I just have a hard time imagining the State giving the benefit of the doubt.

Why was a veneer of procedural due process even given at all? These cases were fairly in history as well, where the law was pretty clear about the status of slaves? It just seems hard to imagine it ever worked out for any of the slaves.

Who would represent the slaves? In some cases I can see a master paying for the it if there was clear benefit...

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